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In this paper we analyse agricultural land prices in the German Federal State of Brandenburg 
within the period 2000-2011. Our objective is to understand the price formation process in 
foreclosures. One effect of foreclosures relates to pressured sales, which likely lead to a price 
discount, and another effect relates to public auctions leading to a price premium. The overall 
effect is derived using direct covariate matching. Our results show that on average, price 
premia rather than price discounts are realized in forced sales of farmland. The price 
differential, however, is not constant and depends on prevailing land market conditions. 
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Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Beitrag werden landwirtschaftliche Bodenpreise in Brandenburg analysiert. Ziel ist 
es, die Preisbildung bei zwangsversteigerten Flächen zu untersuchen. Die Wirkung einer 
Zwangsversteigerung kann in zwei Teileffekte zerlegt werden. Dem preismindernden Effekt 
eines Notverkaufes steht der preiserhöhende Effekt einer Auktion gegenüber. Die Kenntnis 
des Gesamteffekts ist unter anderem wichtig, um Beleihungswerte landwirtschaftlicher 
Flächen zu ermitteln. Die empirische Analyse stützt sich auf umfangreiche Einzeldaten des 
Oberen Gutachterausschuss für Grundstückswerte im Land Brandenburg zwischen 2000 und 
2011. Um den Treatmenteffekt der Zwangsversteigerung kausalanalytisch erfassen zu können, 
wird ein Matchingverfahren angewendet. Es zeigt sich, dass bei Zwangsversteigerungen im 
Durchschnitt keine Preisabschläge, sondern Preisaufschläge gegenüber vergleichbaren, nicht 
zwangsversteigerten Flächen realisiert werden. Allerdings sind die Preisdifferenzen nicht 
konstant, sondern variieren in Abhängigkeit von der Lage auf dem Bodenmarkt. 
Schlüsselwörter: Zwangsversteigerung, Landpreise, Treatmenteffekt 
 Forced Sales and Farmland Prices iii 
SiAg-Working Paper 11 (2012); HU Berlin 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... i 
Zusammenfassung ...................................................................................................................... ii 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
2 Previous Research and Derivation of Hypotheses ................................................................. 2 
3 Forced Sales in the Federal State of Brandenburg ................................................................ 3 
3.1 Legal Framework of Forced Sales in Germany .............................................................. 3 
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................... 4 
4 Model and Results ................................................................................................................. 7 
4.1 Modelling the Treatment Effect ..................................................................................... 7 
4.1.1 ATT using Price Regressions ................................................................................ 9 
4.1.2 ATT using Matching ........................................................................................... 10 
4.2 Results .......................................................................................................................... 12 
5 Discussion and Conclusions ................................................................................................ 15 
References ................................................................................................................................ 17 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Summary statistics of the farmland prices and characteristics ............................. 6 
Table 2. Regression results ............................................................................................... 13 
Table 3. Predicted hypothetical price and observed price for the  
forced sales group ............................................................................................... 14 
Table 4. Mean observed prices and matched price observations using the 
Mahalanobis distance and Kernel matching  
(Gaussian Kernel, h=0.06) .................................................................................. 15 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Development of farmland prices (Brandenburg) .................................................. 5 
Figure 2. Mean price (2008-2010) per county (Landkreis) and  
average soil quality in Brandenburg ..................................................................... 7 
 

 Forced Sales and Farmland Prices 1 
SiAg-Working Paper 11 (2012); HU Berlin 
1 Introduction 
This paper is motivated by the simple but not trivial question: What is a reasonable mortgage 
lending value for agricultural land? It is essential for creditors to know this value when 
offering loans to farmers, since the mortgage lending value constitutes an upper limit for the 
loan. The idea behind this premise is that the mortgaged land can be sold at any time within 
the loan contract period, at least at the mortgaged lending value in case of a loan default. A 
starting point for deriving the mortgage lending value is the sale value (liquidation value) of 
land, which, in general, will deviate from bookkeeping values. The mortgage lending value, 
however, is usually smaller than the current sales value. There are at least two reasons to 
justify this price-shaving: first, the future sale value in the contract period is random and thus 
a risk-averse lender will discount the current sales value as a precautionary measure. Second, 
in case of a credit default, the liquidation of the mortgaged land will be a forced sale that takes 
place within a bankruptcy proceeding. It is frequently supposed that realized prices in forced 
sales are lower compared to “normal” land market transactions where sellers are not under 
financial stress (e.g., ALLEN and SWISHER, 2000). In this paper we focus on the second 
argument, that is, we want to explore if there is really a price discount in forced sales and if 
so, how large it is. This question has to be answered empirically. For that purpose we analyse 
land price data in the Federal State of Brandenburg that have been realized in forced sales 
from 2000-2011, and compare them with prices of unforced sales in that state. A direct 
comparison of these two groups and the identification of a forced-sales-effect is challenging 
for several reasons. First, land characteristics vary between the sold land plots and one must 
control for these differences carefully. Second, the land market in East Germany evolved 
dynamically within the last decade, showing high rates of price increase. This development 
may cover a price discount of forced sales. Finally, there might exist a self-selection problem 
such that land being sold in foreclosure auctions differs systematically from land in a control 
group. Thus, we have to create a proper counterfactual. The statistical approach that we 
pursue in this paper accounts for all three problems.  
The paper is organised as follows: We start with a literature review in order to provide a 
theoretical foundation for our hypothesized impact of forced sales. Next, we briefly describe 
the land market in Brandenburg and the legal environment under which forced sales are 
carried out, followed by a description of our data. Section 4 discusses two statistical 
approaches and their respective results. The paper ends with conclusions about the 
determination of mortgage lending values for agricultural land. 
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2 Previous Research and Derivation of Hypotheses 
Three strands of literature are relevant for our research question. The first one deals with the 
pricing of farmland. The objective of this strand is to identify factors that determine the level 
of land prices. Knowledge of these factors is helpful for understanding price differentials in 
cross-sectional data. This kind of analysis is usually conducted in a hedonic pricing 
framework (cf. PALMQUIST and DANIELSON 1989). HUANG et al. (2006) classify factors that 
are commonly used in hedonic studies on land prices into four groups, namely productivity 
characteristics, neighbourhood characteristics, location and environmental characteristics. 
Almost all empirical studies on farmland values include a measure of soil quality and parcel 
size to capture productive capacity (e.g., XU, MITTELHAMMER and BARKLEY, 1993). 
MENDELSON, NORDHAUS and SHAW (1994) focus on the effect of climatic variables on 
farmland values. For example, population density and per capita income are frequently used 
to represent non-farm factors and competing potential land uses. Location characteristics are, 
for example, distance to large cities, and environmental variables may refer to swine farm 
density or the number of biogas plants in a region (cf. BREUSTEDT and HABERMAN, 2010). 
Moreover, almost all recent hedonic studies on land prices emphasize the necessity of 
properly dealing with spatial effects (cf. PATTON and MCERLEAN, 2003). 
The second strand of literature discusses the impact of forced or pressured sales on asset 
prices. It is consensually argued that knowledge about the fact that the current owner faces an 
urgent need to dispose of the asset for liquidity or health reasons leads to a price discount 
compared to unpressured sales (ALLEN and SWISHER, 2000). The decisive point here is that 
the asset market may face a temporal and/or regional illiquidity so that additional supply 
lowers the market clearing price. This effect is less pronounced in a booming market that is 
short in supply. Empirical evidence for this conjecture is provided by CAMPBELL et al. (2009) 
for the U.S. housing market. Further reasons for price discounts are vandalism or protection 
costs as long as houses are vacant. These reasons, however, are specific to the housing market 
and do not apply to the land market, where land does not usually fall idle before a forced sale. 
Analyses of pressured land sales in agriculture are rare. An exception is KING and SINDEN 
(1994) who surprisingly find no significant price discount in the Australian land market. 
The third strand of literature analyses the role of the respective market mechanism in price 
formation. This literature is relevant here, because pressured sales are usually carried out in 
the framework of an auction. Therefore, it is necessary to disentangle two effects when 
analysing empirical price data: first, the impact of time and liquidity constraints of the seller, 
and second, the influence of the market mechanism. The latter aspect has been discussed in 
the auction literature both theoretically and empirically. LUSHT (1996) compares house prices 
realized in (English) auctions with prices that came out in private negotiations: He finds that 
prices brought out on auctions were about 8 per cent higher compared with private house 
sales. This finding is questioned by MAYER (1995, 1998), who argues that if auctioned assets 
sell at higher prices than in search markets, both market mechanisms could not co-exist 
because auctions also allow one to sell the asset sooner. Thus, sellers were always better off 
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using auctions. Using data from real estate auctions in the U.S., MAYER finds price discounts 
for auctioned properties. These price discounts, however, are not constant over time. Rather, 
price discounts on auctions are relatively large in downturn markets and they almost vanish in 
booming markets. Significant price discounts on auctions are also reported by ALLEN and 
SWISHER (2000). However, QUAN (2002) offers a theoretical explanation for why auctions 
could offer price premia relative to search markets. He derives a partial equilibrium model 
where buyers and sellers can choose between an auction and a search market as a mechanism 
for real estate disposition. In equilibrium it is optimal for buyers incurring high search costs to 
attend an auction instead of participating in the search market. Due to this self-selection, 
buyers are willing to pay higher prices at auctions. 
To sum up, there is no clear prediction on the size and the sign of a price discount/premium 
for enforced land sales from auctions. While it is undisputed that pressured sales will result in 
lower prices, this effect might be (over)compensated by using auctions as a market mechanism. 
In any case we expect price discounts to be lower in prospering market conditions. 
3 Forced Sales in the Federal State of Brandenburg 
3.1 Legal Framework of Forced Sales in Germany 
In Germany, forced sale (or foreclosure) is a tool for creditors (e.g., banks) to dispose of loan 
securities whose debtors (e.g., farms) default on their debt service. Here, we focus on debtors 
who mortgaged their agricultural land. Important parameters in a forced sale process are the 
calculation of the regular market price, the minimum bid and the auction date, as well as the 
date of bid acceptance and the date of ownership transfer. Stakeholders in a forced sale 
process are the court-appointed appraiser, the judicial officer, the creditor and his estate agent 
(KOLKMANN, 2010). The responsibility of the appraiser is to calculate the open market price. 
This price is highly relevant because the expected price of the bidders and creditors aligns  
to the open market price estimation of the expert. The minimum bid marks the starting value 
of a forced sale auction, and takes into account the costs of the foreclosure, as well as  
the permanent rights of third persons to the farmland, e.g. the rights of way. The judicial 
officer guides the whole forced sale process; his principal duty is conducting the auction. In 
addition, the judicial officer is responsible for the period between initial request and the actual 
auction appointment. The appointment for the forced sale auction must be published at least 
six weeks and not earlier than six months prior to the auction date. The announcement of the 
forced auction is regularly distributed through an electronic information system or through 
newspapers that are appointed by the responsible court (§36(2), §39(1) & §43 (1) GESETZ 
ÜBER DIE ZWANGSVERSTEIGERUNG UND DIE ZWANGSVERWALTUNG (ZVG), last Revision 
07.11.2011). Furthermore, the judicial officer must ensure a fair process for all participants. In 
most cases there is more than one creditor, but regularly the principal creditor is a bank 
because it normally has the largest amount of outstanding accounts.  
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3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In general, farmland is an immobile and scarce production factor, and since all land is in use, 
land is only available on the market if some farms quit from agriculture and sell or lease their 
land. In the East German federal states, the land market has some peculiarities since the 
formerly state-owned land is privatized and sold by public auctions. The main seller on behalf 
of the German Ministry of Finance is the “Bodenverwertungs- und -verwaltungs GmbH” 
(BVVG). Moreover, the East German farmland market is a dynamically evolving market and 
offers an interesting opportunity to analyse farmland prices with several suppliers. The 
Federal State of Brandenburg seems representative here since land price data for Brandenburg 
are provided by the official committee of valuation experts for land “Oberer Gutachter-
ausschuss für Grundstückswerte im Land Brandenburg”.1  
The dataset contains information about land prices, soil quality, plot size and the date of sale. 
The observations can be classified into unforced sales and forced sales. The latter includes 
only cases with a foreclosure procedure. In the following we consider this group as the 
treatment group. The control group contains all other forms of land transactions, such as the 
‘normal’ market sales that take place if one farmer ceases production and offers land either 
through a non-public auction or via negotiations with other farms, and also sales from 
auctions within the privatization process. This implies that in both groups – forced and non-
forced sales – we observe prices from public auctions: the procedure of forced sales, and the 
auctions within the privatization process. Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify the 
BVVG land sales in the data. As a consequence, we cannot explicitly identify the effect of the 
public auction itself. The original data have been modified in several ways prior to our 
analysing the impact of forced sales. First, so-called unusual sales have been removed. These 
include transactions between relatives or similar cases which are supposed to be not 
representative for regular price building. This left us with 58,464 observations representing a 
total traded area of 324,145 hectares. Unfortunately, we had to omit more than half of the 
remaining observations due to missing information about price-relevant factors, e.g., soil 
quality. Furthermore, we eliminated observations which were sold at a price of exactly 
1.00 €/m² since these observations can be assigned to highway compensation procedures (i.e., 
farmers who are forced to sell their land due to highway construction and receive a fixed 
compensation in return). We also exclude outlier observations in which land is expected to be 
used for residential development. Overall, the final sample includes 26,786 observations with 
a traded area volume of 116,787 hectares from January 2000 to September 2011. This makes 
up a share of about 46% of the original observations and 36% of the sold area during that 
period. The number of forced sales within this sample adds up to 284 (1%) observations over 
the entire period. 
                                                          
1  Each federal state in Germany has such a committee endowed with some administrative power. Their task is 
to ensure market transparency by collecting all agricultural land sales prices and providing standard land 
values, which are disseminated through an annual market report. Moreover, this committee also provides 
expert opinions with regard to specific land values.  
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As shown in Figure 1, the farmland prices increased rapidly over the last 5 years. Figure 1 
also depicts the price development of forced sales; they seem to be more volatile compared to 
non-forced sales over the years, which might also be partly due to the low number of 
observations. It can be further seen that prices start to increase from 2006 on, and in the last 
two years the prices are much higher compared to non-forced sales. This provides a first 
impression of the price differences between forced and unforced sales; it seems that there is 
no discount on forced sales. Both groups, however, may differ in price-relevant factors, so 
that a direct comparison may be misleading.  
Figure 1. Development of farmland prices (Brandenburg) 
 
2011: Observations only until September. 
Source: Own calculations, data provided by OBERER GUTACHTERAUSSCHUSS BRANDENBURG. 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the crucial farmland characteristics for the non-
forced and the forced sales (treatment) group. Note that soil quality is measured on a scale 
from 1 to 102, which reflects the soils’ productive capacity. The mean price of forced sales is 
higher; however, it also shows a higher standard deviation. Soil quality does not differ much 
between the groups, and interestingly, the average plot size is higher in the non-forced sales 
group. Note that forced sales occurred later in time, on average, than the non-forced sales, and 
thus they may be driven by the general market price increase since 2006. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the farmland prices and characteristics 











Mean 2,844 26.34 25.51 4.38 
Std. deviation 1,572 11.19 7.03 10.22 
Min. 58 1 1 0,01 




Mean 3,074 26.98 23.46 3.08 
Std. deviation 2,588 11.01 6.15 5.82 
Min. 154 1 8 0.01 
Max. 20,835 72 40 47.56 
Total 
N=26,786 
Mean 2,847 26.34 25.49 4.36 
Std. deviation 1,586 11.19 7.02 10.18 
Min. 58 1 1 0,01 
Max. 20,835 80 60 427.77 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OBERER GUTACHTERAUSSCHUSS BRANDENBURG (2000-2011). 
 
Figure 2 shows average prices for the years 2008-2010 for each county (Landkreis) in 
Brandenburg on the left-hand side. In addition, the right-hand side of this figure depicts the 
average soil quality points. Apparently there is a strong relation between soil quality and the 
price for agricultural land. In the north-east of Brandenburg, a higher average soil quality is 
observed, accompanied by comparably higher land prices. Visual inspection of the regional 
distribution of the land prices in Figure 2 suggests the existence of spatial dependency in this 
variable. Farmland plots with rather low prices are concentrated, and form low-price regions. 
It is also very likely that high land prices occur in high-price regions, i.e., neighbouring plots 
are also very likely sold at a high price level. In other words, there is no chessboard structure 
where high and low land prices are observed within smaller regions. The same holds for high-
price regions. Similar findings are reported in previous studies on hedonic land pricing (e.g., 
PATERSON and BOYLE, 2002; PACE et al., 1998) describe similar phenomena. Unfortunately, 
we are unable to test for possible spatial correlation in the prices, since no spatial coordinates 
of the land plots are available in the data. In the subsequent analysis spatial dependence is 
taken into account by controlling for soil quality, and we additionally introduce county 
dummies when explaining the land prices.  
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Figure 2. Mean price (2008-2010) per county (Landkreis) and average soil quality in 
Brandenburg 
 
Source:  Own calculations; data provided by OBERER GUTACHTERAUSSCHUSS BRANDENBURG and LANDESAMT 
FÜR LÄNDLICHE ENTWICKLUNG, LANDWIRTSCHAFT UND FLURNEUORDNUNG. 
 
4 Model and Results 
4.1 Modelling the Treatment Effect 
Based on insights from the literature review, it is very likely that two main but reversing 
effects are present when analysing forced sales. First, the public tender ensures market 
transparency and thereby increases the number of potential bidders. This may induce a 
positive price effect. Second, the procedure of a forced sale under time pressure may induce a 
negative effect. As mentioned above, our data set does not allow us to distinguish between 
forced auction sales and auction sales that occur, for instance, with the privatization of 
formerly state-owned land in East Germany. Thus, we can only determine the effect of a 
forced sale within a public tendering procedure and it is not possible to isolate those effects. 
To measure the impact of a forced sale on the farmland price, there is a need to create a 
counterfactual situation, i.e., what would have been the price if the land was not sold as a 
forced sale via a public auction? The potential price for a plot of land that was sold under 
forced sales conditions is never observed under non-forced conditions. Such observations are 
only available within experiments and hence, direct estimates of the individual forced-sales 
effects are not possible. Thus, we refer to the estimation of aggregated causal effects 
(MORGAN and WINSHIP, 2007). 
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In the following we use the terms of control (unforced) and treatment (forced) states. Since a 
plot of land cannot be observed at the same time as a non-forced and forced sale, we define an 




if forced, and 
otherwise 
where i indexes2 the observations. The observed price can thus be written as: 
1 0(1 )i i i i ip d p d p  
wherein the respective prices are accordingly denoted by 1p  (forced sales price) and 0p  (non-
forced sales price).  
We distinguish between the expected average treatment effect (ATE) and the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The ATE is defined as the difference between the 
expected prices in the treatment and control group:  
(1) 1 0[ | 1] [ | 0]ATE E p d E p d  
where 1[ | 1]E p d  denotes the expected price under forced sales conditions and 
0[ | 0]E p d  the expected price under non-forced sales conditions. The ATT is defined as 
follows:  
(2)  1 0[ | 1]ATT E p p d  
where 0[ | 1]E p d  denotes the expected hypothetical outcome of an observation in the 
treatment group under the assumption of the control state, i.e., the possibly-realized price for a 
plot that was sold via a forced-sale under normal (non-forced sales) conditions. The challenge 
now is to estimate the ATT. We are able to control for differences in plot size, quality or date 
of sale, but we cannot observe both outcomes for the same plot of farmland. This means we 
need to find a good estimate for the ATT conditional on the covariates using 0[ | , 1]E p dx , 
which denotes the expected price of a plot that was in the forced-sales group under non-forced 
sales conditions conditional on the k covariates summarized in the 1k -vector x .  
Under the so-called conditional independence assumption (CIA) the treatment assignment 
while controlling for the covariates must be independent from the respective outcome. It 
follows that 0[ | , 0]E p dx  equals the hypothetical price 0[ | , 1]E p dx , i.e., the price and its 
expectation are equal no matter whether the piece of land was initially in the forced sales 
(treatment) group. This is why land sold via a forced-sale procedure does not affect the finally 
                                                          
2  In what follows we will suppress the subscript i where possible.  
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realized price via the auction. This assumption is rather strict; in either case, we could not 
account for possible factors since such information is not available. Still, there might be some 
unobserved factors like regional patterns in the land market that may affect both the treatment 
assignment (being a forced sale) and the outcome (realized price). This means we cannot rule 
out any bias from omitting factors that affect both, even though we assume this bias to be low 
since the main determinants for the treatment assignment are not related to the plot of land 
itself.3 The challenge is that only under the CIA can the ATT be consistently estimated, 
otherwise the ‘selection bias’ occurs. The latter becomes apparent by expanding equation (1):  
(3)  
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
[ | 1] [ | 1] [ | 1] [ | 0]
[ | 1] [ | 1] [ | 0]
ATT selectionbias
E p d E p d E p d E p d
E p p d E p d E p d  
In what follows we refer to two approaches to derive the ATT. First we define the 
counterfactual model, also known as potential outcome model, based on a regression analysis. 
Thereby, we estimate a price function for the control group and use the estimates to predict a 
hypothetical price using the forced sales observations. This approach ignores the selection 
bias; however, since we presume this bias to be low and cannot define any instruments, the 
ATT will be biased, though at a moderate level. Second, we refer to a matching procedure 
(nearest neighbour). The idea is to select close observations with similar characteristics 
defined through the covariates such that the counterfactual is taken from the observation 
sample.4 This implies that for each forced sale observation, we seek a matched counterfactual 
price to directly compare the means. A rather simple mean comparison would be naïve, since 
it would neglect possible differences in the land characteristics such as soil quality and plot 
size. 
4.1.1 ATT using Price Regressions 
Deriving the ATT using price regressions in its simplest way would be just adding the 
indicator id  as a dummy variable (additive or shift effect); however, this neglects different 
pricing mechanisms. This in turn leads to differing relations between the price and the 
characteristics of land (multiplicative effect). In both cases the possibly endogenous treatment 
indicator would not be accounted for. Since we have no information about reasons for the 
forced-sale and regional peculiarities that may affect both the treatment assignment and the 
outcome, it is impossible to control for the treatment decision. We proceed in a different way 
and estimate the price function using the observations from the control group. The estimated 
coefficients of the price function are then taken to predict a hypothetical price for the forced 
sales data. This creates counterfactual observations for the treatment group. The regression 
equation is defined as: 
                                                          
3  See WOOLDRIDGE (2002) and the cited literature therein for further details.  
4  An excellent overview is given by HENNING and MICHALEK (2008).  
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(4) 0 00 0i iip ux   
where 0ix  denotes the i-th row (observation) of the matrix of covariates containing soil quality, 
plot size, as well as regional county (Landkreis) and year dummies. Symbol 0iu  denotes the 
error term assumed to have a zero mean and being uncorrelated with the covariates. The 











d x   
wherein 1n  denotes the number of forced sales observations in the data set and 0ˆ  the vector 
of estimates from the regression in (4) using the control group data. The ATT is derived as the 













4.1.2 ATT using Matching 
Matching procedures can be applied as an alternative to regression analysis. The idea is to 
compare one individual from the treatment group with the individuals from the control group 
by finding similar and comparable observations. In the context of matching similarity is 
usually measured by means of propensity scores, i.e. the probability of being treated. 
Formally, it would be possible to apply propensity score matching; however, from an 
economic perspective we face the problem of interpreting the propensity score as a probability 
without data about the initial land owners and users, which seems crucial to explain the 
probability of being forced to sell land within a foreclosure. We apply direct covariate 
matching that allows us to find comparable pairs of observations from the treatment and 
control group with similar characteristics based on covariates like soil quality or size. The 
challenge is to define similarity between several covariates describing the characteristics of 
the plot, which in turn are crucial determinants for the realized prices. We use the 
Mahalanobis distance as a metric to define the similarity between the plots. The Mahalanobis 
distance reduces the dimensionality since it measures the distance between two observations 
based on the covariates in a one-dimensional metric. To ease notation we denote from here 
onwards the forced sales observations with 11,...,i n  and the control observations are 
indexed with 01,...,j n . Since for each treated observation the distance to each of the non-
treated observations must be calculated, this results in a ( 0 1n ) vector of distances for each 
treated observation i . The Mahalanobis distance between observation i and j is defined as 
follows:  
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(7) 1 0 1 1 0( ) ' ( )ij i j i jM xx x x x   
where x  denotes the variance-covariance matrix of the covariates correcting for correlation 
of the covariates. Symbol 1ix  denotes the i-th row of the (
1n k ) matrix of covariates of the 
treated observations (indicated by 1) and 0jx  denotes the j-th row of the (
0n k ) matrix of 
covariates of the non-treated observations (indicated by 0). This metric takes into account the 
correlation between covariates and it has the “equal per cent bias reducing” property (RUBIN, 
1980). Another advantage is its straightforward implementation.5  
Based on this distance measure it is possible create a matched price for a plot that was sold 
under forced-sales conditions ( 0ˆ matchedip ) using the outcome(s) of one or some similar plots 









p w p  
where ijw  denotes the weights on the non-treated j being a comparison with the treated 
observation i and its definition depends on the respective matching algorithm. The average 













ATT p   
We use a Kernel matching algorithm which includes all control observations to construct the 
counterfactural for each treatment case. The weights ijw  are calculated using the Kernel-
function of the Mahalanobis metric, ijK M . Here we use the Gaussian distribution as a 













M MK h h
 
where h  denotes the bandwidth parameter; it controls for the smoothness while estimating the 
weights.  
                                                          
5  We use STATA 12 and the command psmatch2 developed by LEUVEN and SIANESI (2005). 
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4.2 Results 
Starting with the derivation of the ATT based on regression results, we proceed as follows. 
We use the observations from the control group and estimate a price function. The price 
regression includes characteristics like quality of arable land and grassland, plot size, the 
squared plot size, year dummies in reference to 2000, and in order to reduce the possible 
spatial correlation, county dummies (Landkreise) were considered.6 BoxCox7 testing results 
reveal a log-linear model, i.e., we regress the logarithms of the land prices per square meter 






ln( ) l ti AZ i GZ i area i area i county l i year t i i
l t
p AZ GZ area area D D e  
where l indexes the respective 18 counties in Brandenburg and t indexes time. The variables 
AZ and GZ denote the soil quality for arable and grassland, respectively, while area denotes 
the plot size and ie  denotes an error term.  
The coefficient estimates for all - and -parameters are given in table 2. The majority of 
the variables is significant at the 1% level (superscripted by ***). We used robust standard 
errors to account for possible heteroskedastic variances. Referring to Figure 1, it is not 
surprising that the year dummies from 2001 to 2006 are not significant, but price increases 
from 2007 onwards can be shown to be significant. The R-squared is rather high, at 0.90. 
Still, there might be some spatial correlation present which could not be accounted for.  
                                                          
6  As mentioned above, possible spatial correlation cannot be considered using spatial econometric techniques 
since no plot-specific spatial coordinates are available. 
7  Details of this procedure can, for instance, be found in DAVIDSON and MACKINNON (2004). 
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Table 2. Regression results 
Dependent Variable 
Log price (€/m²) 
Coefficient estimates P-value 
Soil quality arable land (AZ) 0.006 0.000*** 
Soil quality grassland (GZ) -0.002 0.000*** 
Area (hectares) -0.002 0.000*** 
Area squared (hectares) 1.33e-05 0.001*** 
D2001 -0.016 0.364 
D2002 0.013 0.462 
D2003 0.026 0.163 
D2004 -0.008 0.631 
D2005 0.0175 0.305 
D2006 0.025 0.133 
D2007 0.086 0.000*** 
D2008 0.237 0.000*** 
D2009 0.375 0.000*** 
D2010 0.426 0.000*** 
D2011 0.498 0.000*** 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OBERER GUTACHTERAUSSCHUSS BRANDENBURG (2000-2011). 
 
The naïve mean comparison as shown in section 3.2 corresponds to the ATE of about 
230 €/ha (all years). Based on the parameter estimates for the covariates, we predict a 
hypothetical price using only the forced sales observations. The mean difference between the 
hypothetical price from the prediction and the realized forced sales price is 600 €/ha. This 
effect corresponds to the average treatment effect of the treated. We further expect these 
effects to vary over time. In Table 3, the predicted hypothetical price and the means of the 
annually observed prices of both groups and the ATT are shown.  
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Table 3. Predicted hypothetical price and observed price for the forced sales group 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OBERER GUTACHTERAUSSCHUSS BRANDENBURG (2000-2011). 
 
The message of the ATT concerns the price difference depending on the state (forced or 
unforced) of one forced observation, and therefore expresses the pure impact of the auction 
under compulsion. The ATE instead reveals the difference without any adjustments 
concerning other price-influencing factors like soil quality and plot size. As we observe that 
the ATE is smaller than the ATT, we conclude that forced sales are more expensive, even 
though their characteristics seem to have a lower price-increasing force compared to the 
characteristics of the unforced sales. In other words, the positive forced sale effect exceeds the 
effect of other characteristics.  
We now compare the results based on the regressions to the findings based on matching. The 
Mahalanobis metric was calculated with regular price-influencing factors like soil quality, 
plot size (without the squared version), day of transaction, county dummies and the principal 
characteristic (arable or grassland). In contrast to the regression analysis, we consider the time 
differently; we use time as a continuous variable since we expected to have more precise 
matches with respect to time. The smaller the Mahalanobis metric between two observations 
is, the more similar are the two observations concerning the mentioned factors. Based on the 
Kernel matching algorithm using the Gaussian Kernel function, we find on average an ATT of 
282 €/ha over the years. It should be noted that 3 observations are not within the common 
support range, i.e., their covariates differ that much from the observations in the control group 
that those could not be matched. The Kernel matching approach also carries out a positive 













2000 2,354 3,246 2,400 892 
2001 2,445 1,151 2,390 -1,294 
2002 1,958 2,692 2,450 734 
2003 2,075 2,368 2,400 293 
2004 1,878 1,960 2,340 82 
2005 1,969 2,595 2,450 626 
2006 2,279 1,589 2,470 -690 
2007 2,237 3,418 2,620 1,181 
2008 2,584 3,437 3,070 853 
2009 2,902 3,183 3,470 281 
2010 3,295 4,070 3,610 775 
2011 3,159 5,125 3,960 1,966 
Total 2,475 3,075 2,844 600 
 Forced Sales and Farmland Prices 15 
SiAg-Working Paper 11 (2012); HU Berlin 
forced sale effect, but the extent is only half of the ATT of the regression model. Since in the 
Kernel matching algorithm all observations from the control group are used to construct the 
weights the ATT may be interpreted as the difference between the treated prices and the 
weighted average of the non-treated ones. The derived price differences show more years with 
a negative effect but confirm the positive effect from 2007 onwards. The results are shown in 
Table 4. 
Table 4. Mean observed prices and matched price observations using the 
Mahalanobis distance and Kernel matching (Gaussian Kernel, h=0.06) 
Year Matched price 











2000 2,764 3,246 2,410 744 
2001 1,985 1,151 2,390 -835 
2002 2,311 2,692 2,450 508 
2003 2,477 2,368 2,400 -110 
2004 2,355 1,960 2,340 -395 
2005 2,177 2,595 2,450 412 
2006 2,409 1,589 2,470 -884 
2007 2,602 3,418 2,620 815 
2008 2,956 3,437 3,070 481 
2009 3,134 3,183 3,470 49 
2010 3,629 4,070 3,610 440 
2011 3,625 5,125 3,960 1500 
Total 2,805 3,075 2,844 282 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OBERER GUTACHTERAUSSCHUSS BRANDENBURG (2000-2011). 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
By contrasting land prices realized in foreclosures with prices from regular land sales, we 
found that forced sales did not sell at a discount, on average. On the contrary, according to the 
most conservative estimate prices, quotes in forced sales were about 300 € higher than prices 
in non-forced sales in Brandenburg during the last decade. This result is somewhat surprising, 
but not contradictory to pricing theory. As mentioned in section 2, two opposite effects 
interact in the price formation of foreclosures, namely the (negative) liquidity effect of a 
pressured sale on the one hand, and the (positive) effect of auctions on the other hand. Our 
results reveal that the latter effect outweighs the former in Brandenburg’s land market. 
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Another interesting finding is that the price premium related to foreclosures is not constant 
over time. We rather observe substantially higher price premia since 2006, i.e., the beginning 
of the price boom in land markets in the new federal states. This result is in line with earlier 
empirical findings reported in the auction and real estate literature. 
What can we conclude from these outcomes regarding our initial research question, the 
appraisal of mortgage lending values? In view of the documented price premium of 
foreclosures, it is tempting to conclude that no price shaving from regular sale values is 
necessary at all. This ignores, however, the variability of the price differential between forced 
and non-forced sales, as well as the variability in the level of land prices. In 2001, for 
example, land put up for compulsory sale sold at a discount of approximately 50% compared 
with regular land market transactions. That means if the mortgage lending value of land in 
2000 was fixed at the current sales price (i.e. 2,400 €/ha on average) creditors would have 
suffered a considerable loss in case of a debt default in 2001. This situation is the worst case 
that occurred in the observation period, but extremely risk-averse debtors may consider it 
relevant. As a general rule, one can state that price shaving of mortgage lending values should 
be more pronounced in a downturn market for two reasons: first, the expected price level is 
likely to decrease, and second, the price difference between foreclosure prices and normal 
sales prices may become negative. Moreover, one can conclude that a constant discount on a 
current land price is usually not appropriate. One should rather adapt the mortgage lending 
value to the expected conditions of the land market in the credit period. 
Nevertheless, these findings must be interpreted considering the limitations of the matching 
procedure. It was not yet possible to test whether the found differences are statistically 
significant. Even though matching is a popular method for evaluating many types of effects, it 
remains a controversial issue in the evaluation literature. The reasons for being in the forced 
sales group cannot be assumed to be fully independent of the price formation process in local 
markets. HECKMAN et al. (1998) point to the necessity of considering the economic reasoning 
behind the treatment, and to account in an econometric sense for the endogenous treatment 
variable. A further critical assumption can be seen in the additive separable treatment effect. 
There might exist a different price function under forced sales that could not be identified due 
to data limitations. Since the available data permitted us to consider more sophisticated 
econometric models and evaluation methods, our findings can be interpreted as a first 
indication of price differences in a forced sales auction procedure. Future work must further 
disentangle the effects for public auctions and forced sales through public auctions. Also, the 
regional settings in the land market need to be taken into account since we cannot exclude any 
interaction, nor competitive issues that may affect both the local price for land and the reasons 
for insolvency.  
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